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Substantial research with adults has characterized the contents of individuals’ counterfactual 
thoughts. In contrast, little is known about the types of events children invoke in their 
counterfactual thoughts, and how they compare to their causal ascriptions. In the current study, 
we asked children open-ended counterfactual and causal questions about events in which a 
character’s action enabled a force of nature to cause a minor mishap. Children aged 3.5 to 8 
years (N = 160) tended to invoke characters’ actions in their counterfactual judgments to explain 
how an event could have been prevented (e.g., “She should have closed the window.”) and forces 
of nature in their causal judgments (e.g., “The rain got it wet.”). Younger children were also 
significantly more likely than older children to invoke forces of nature in their counterfactuals 
(e.g., “It shouldn’t have rained”). These results indicate that, similar to reasoning patterns found 
in adults, children tend to focus on controllable enabling conditions when reasoning 
counterfactually, but also point to some developmental differences. The developmental 
similarities suggest counterfactual reasoning may serve a similar function from middle childhood 
through adulthood. 
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What is and what never should have been:  
Children’s causal and counterfactual judgments about the same events 
Humans have a tendency to reflect on what could have been. An individual who misses her flight 
after being stopped by a traffic jam may entertain counterfactual thoughts such as “I should have 
left my house sooner” or “If only I’d taken a different route”. The human mind shows 
predictable patterns in the alternatives it generates when considering “if only…” scenarios 
(Byrne, 2002; Byrne, 2005). For instance, adults mutate exceptional, rather than routine events 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), controllable rather than uncontrollable ones (Girotto & Rizzo, 
1991; Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Roese, 1997), and enabling conditions over strong causes (e.g., 
Mandel & Lehman, 1996; McCloy & Byrne, 2002; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995; Wells & 
Gavanski, 1989). These “fault lines” of reality show reliable inter-individual consistency (Byrne, 
2005; Hofstader, 1985; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). These patterns in counterfactual thinking 
are thought to influence individuals’ ability to attribute causation and blame, and make adaptive 
decisions in the future (e.g., Byrne, 2016; Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
A question for developmental research is whether these patterns are fundamental features 
of the human reasoning system (Beck & Riggs, 2014). Do children show similar patterns in their 
earliest counterfactual thoughts, or are these biases acquired over time? If they do not, it may 
suggest that the adaptive function of counterfactual thinking emerges and develops over time, or 
that counterfactual thinking serves a different function in childhood.  
The majority of research on counterfactual thinking in development has asked when 
children are capable of thinking counterfactually. These studies indicate that children can first 
engage in counterfactual reasoning around the age of 4 (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 
2006, standard counterfactuals; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996; Nyhout & Ganea, 2019a; Riggs 
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& Robinson, 1998). Most of these studies have required children to select a logically correct 
answer in response to a counterfactual question to be credited with counterfactual reasoning.  
Some previous work has, however, looked for the presence of fault lines or biases in 
children’s counterfactual reasoning indirectly by examining how their judgments of fault and 
blame change in different contexts. Typically, researchers ask children to judge which of two 
characters will feel worse or is more deserving of blame, with the idea that such a judgment 
reflects the availability of a counterfactual alternative. For example, 6- and 8-year-olds in one 
study exhibited the temporal order bias, attributing blame to a character who acted most recently 
in a sequence of events (Meehan & Byrne, 2005), as seen in adults (Byrne et al., 2000). In 
another study, 7-year-olds, but not younger children, were more likely to blame a character who 
behaved atypically (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004), in line with findings with adults that exceptional 
events are more mutable (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In the same study, 7-year-olds were 
more likely to attribute blame in response to acts of commission than acts of omission, showing 
evidence for an action bias. Payir and Guttentag (2019) found a developmental progression 
between the ages of 6 and 11 in children’s use of the temporal order bias and the action bias in 
their judgments of regret and blame. Together, these findings suggest that children exhibit the 
same counterfactual biases as adults in middle childhood, but not sooner.  
On the basis of some of these findings, Beck and colleagues (2014) speculated that 
“children’s counterfactual thinking, while competent, may not show the same biases as 
adults…Perhaps the biases we see in adult counterfactual thinking are the result of children 
learning which events are useful to dwell on for future learning.” (p. 684).  
However, the tasks presented to children in these previous studies were particularly 
challenging. They were situated in contexts requiring children to make inferences about 
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counterfactual emotions (i.e., relief and regret). The development of counterfactual emotions 
appears to be protracted relative to children’s ability to answer counterfactual questions when 
prompted (see Beck, Weisberg, Burns, & Riggs, 2014 for a review). Additionally, the scenarios 
involved multiple events which could have overwhelmed children’s working memory.   
In the current study, we presented children with scenarios that did not require inferences 
about counterfactual emotions, and directly prompted their counterfactual thinking with open-
ended questions. We used short, simple scenarios with only a single character in order to 
constrain the world of possibilities. We were interested in whether children would show a 
tendency, like adults, to invoke a controllable enabling condition in their counterfactuals.  
Adults tend to invoke enabling conditions when generating a counterfactual or when 
thinking about how the event could have been prevented, but attribute the cause of an event to a 
strong cause (Byrne, 2005; Mandel & Lehman, 1996; McEleney & Byrne, 2006). An enabling 
condition is necessary but not sufficient for an outcome to occur, whereas a strong cause is both 
necessary and sufficient (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). Several studies have found that the 
contents of adults’ causal and counterfactual thoughts diverge (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; 
McEleney & Byrne, 2006; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995; but see Spellman & Ndiaye, 2007; 
Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Typically, counterfactual and prevention judgments align with 
enabling conditions that are controllable compared to causal judgments about events that are 
uncontrollable (Mandel & Lehman, 1996). For instance, adults may respond that poor weather 
caused an accident to occur (uncontrollable strong cause), but may undo the event in a 
counterfactual by stating that the character should have stayed home that day (controllable 
enabling condition).  
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There is some previous evidence that children’s causal and counterfactual (or prevention) 
judgments align. Harris and colleagues (1996) found that 3- and 4-year-olds used the availability 
of alternatives in their causal and prevention judgments about minor mishaps. German (1999) 
subsequently found that 5-year-olds used the availability of alternatives when making judgments 
about negative outcomes, but not for positive outcomes. In contrast to the present study, the 
counterfactual alternative in Harris et al’s (1996) and German’s (1999) studies was available to 
children as a character’s foregone choice. It is an open question which events children will 
mutate in response to counterfactual questions when the alternative is not so readily available.  
In the present study, we investigated the types of events children invoke in their 
counterfactuals, how these thoughts relate to causal ascriptions for the same events, and how 
these patterns may change with development. We included a wide age range – spanning when 
children first show evidence of reasoning about counterfactual conditionals (age 3.5 years, Harris 
et al., 1996) to when they show evidence for other types of biases in their reasoning (age 8-9 
years; see above) – to investigate possible developmental changes and better understand when in 
development counterfactual thought begins to show adult-like patterns.  
 In line with several previous studies with children and adults, the events in question 
involved minor mishaps, given that negative events are more likely to elicit counterfactual 
thoughts (German, 1999; McEleney & Byrne, 2006; Roese, 1997; Sanna & Turley, 1996). We 
examined possible developmental changes in the contents of children’s counterfactuals thoughts 
and intra-individual patterns in counterfactual and causal judgments about the same events.  
We presented children with simple events that were caused by a strong, uncontrollable 
cause (a force of nature), but enabled by a controllable event (the character’s action). For 
instance, in one story, a character leaves his drawings outside (enabling condition), which then 
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blow away in the wind (strong cause). Recall that in previous studies with adults, participants 
have tended to attribute the cause of an event to a strong cause, but to invoke the enabling 
condition when generating a counterfactual or thinking about how the event could have been 
prevented (Byrne, 2005; Mandel & Lehman, 1996; McEleney & Bryne, 2006).  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 160 children between the ages of 3.5 years and 8 years. Children were 
recruited and tested in a semi-private area of a museum in a large urban area (n = 92) or in our 
laboratory (n = 68). For inclusion in the study, children were required to be exposed to English 
50% or more of the time, assessed by parental report. For the purposes of recruitment and 
analysis, we divided children into three age groups: preschoolers (n = 53, M = 4.24, SD = 0.46, 
range = 3.39 to 4.99y, 25 girls), kindergartens (n = 56, M = 6.05, SD = 0.58, range = 5.08 to 
6.98y, 30 girls), and school-age (n = 51, M = 7.82, SD = 0.57, range = 7.01 to 8.96y, 25 girls). 
An additional 34 children were tested and excluded for the following reasons: less than 50% 
English exposure (n = 23), failure to answer test questions (n = 10), and parental interference (n 
= 1). Children were predominately White (45%), Asian (27%), or Mixed race (22%), and the 
majority of parents had a Bachelor’s degree or higher (85%). 
Design and procedure 
This study received ethics approval through the research ethics board at [Institution 
blinded]. Stimuli included 4 stories featuring a single character. In all stories, the character was 
doing an activity and an action or lack of action on the part of the character enabled a mishap to 
occur. In all cases, the outcome was caused by a force of nature. For example, in the drawing 
story, a character is sitting on his front porch drawing. He goes inside to get some juice, and the 
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wind blows his drawings away. Stories were presented using PowerPoint. Story images were 
created using the program Storyboard That, and narration was pre-recorded (see Appendix for 
full text). 
Children were tested individually and heard the stories in one of two orders: (1) 
drawings, (2) doll, (3) sandcastle, (4) ice cream, or the reverse order. At the end of each story, 
the experimenter asked a causal question, a control question, and a counterfactual question. The 
causal question asked the child to explain why the outcome had occurred (e.g., “Why are Andy’s 
drawings gone?”) and the counterfactual question asked the child how the outcome could have 
been prevented (e.g., “What should have happened so Andy’s drawings would not be gone?”). 
The wording of the causal and counterfactual questions was designed to be as similar as possible. 
The order of the causal and counterfactual questions was counterbalanced between participants. 
The control question requested a factual piece of information from the story (e.g., “What did 
Andy go inside to get?”) and was always presented between the causal and counterfactual 
questions. Control questions were included to ensure participants attended to the stories, and to 
provide some separation between the causal and counterfactual questions. Children answered 
control questions with a high degree of accuracy (90%).  
Each session was video recorded. Children’s responses were transcribed and coded 
offline.  
Coding 
Children’s responses were coded for whether they referred to (I) the uncontrollable cause 
(force of nature), (II) controllable cause (person’s action), (III) both the force of nature and the 
person’s action, or (IV) other (irrelevant, “I don’t know”). Categories were mutually exclusive. 
Examples of children’s responses to causal and counterfactual questions that fit into each 
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category are displayed in Table 1. One coder coded 100% of children’s responses. A second 
coder coded 30% of total responses. Coding agreement was excellent, 95.5%, κ = 0.92, p < .001. 
 
Table 1. Sample responses to causal and counterfactual questions fitting into each coding 
category (age of child who offered response in parentheses) 
 
Coding category Causal questions Counterfactual questions 
Uncontrollable 
(force of nature) 
• Her ice cream melted because 
of the sun (4) 
• Because the waves smashed it 
down (4) 
• The sun shouldn’t have 
come out (6) 




• Because she didn’t close the 
window (7) 
• If he built it further from the 
water (8) 
• Put a box over it or 
hammer it down with a 
nail (3) 
• Moved it far from the 
ocean (7) 
Both • It rained and she forgot to 
close the window (7) 
• It’s because she left it on her 
blanket and it started melting 
with the sun (3)  
• If something blocks the 
wind or if he draws 
inside (4) 
• If she didn’t put it in 
the sun that was hot (4) 
 
Other • Because she doesn’t like wet 
things (4) 
 
• He can just make 
another sandcastle (5) 
Results 
The proportion of children’s total responses for causal and counterfactual questions that fell into 
each of the 4 coding categories are presented in Figure 1. Each participant received a score out of 
4 for the number of causal and counterfactual responses fitting into each of the 4 coding 
categories, yielding 8 total scores for each participant. Because of the presence of multiple 
dependent scores, we conducted within-subjects comparisons using Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks 
tests, and comparisons between age groups using Mann-Whitney U tests. Given that answers 
coded as both or other made up a small proportion, we focus primarily on differences between 
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uncontrollable and controllable responses. We applied Bonferroni correction for Type I error to 
yield an alpha value of .001 based on the 41 tests reported (.05/41). There were no significant 
effects of question order (p = .104 to .898).  
Responses to causal questions 
Children were significantly more likely to reference an uncontrollable cause than a 
controllable cause for causal questions, Z = 9.80, p < .001. This was also the case when looking 
at each age group separately: preschoolers (Z = 5.32, p < .001), kindergartens (Z = 6.05, p < 
.001), and school-age (Z = 5.72, p < .001). 
There were no significant differences between age groups in the frequency of references 
to either uncontrollable and controllable causes in response to causal questions, ps = .232 to .904. 
However, school-age children (Mann-Whitney U = 894.50, Z = 3.98, p < .001) were more likely 
to mention that both caused the outcome than were preschoolers, but kindergarteners did not 
differ significantly from preschoolers (p = .002) or school-age children (p = .201). Exact age was 
not significantly correlated with frequency of mentions of uncontrollable causes (ρ(160)  = -0.02, 
p = .798) nor controllable causes (ρ(160)= -0.16, p = .046), but was significantly correlated with 
both responses, ρ(160) = 0.32, p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of children’s responses to causal and counterfactual questions in each age 
group referencing an uncontrollable (natural) cause, controllable (person) cause, both, or other.  
 
Responses to counterfactual questions 
In contrast to their responses to causal questions, children were significantly more likely 
to reference a controllable cause than an uncontrollable cause for counterfactual questions (Z = 
7.89, p < .001). This effect held separately for kindergartens (Z = 4.56, p < .001) and school-age 
children (Z = 6.14, p < .001), but not preschoolers (Z = 2.53, p = .012).  
Preschoolers were significantly more likely to reference uncontrollable causes than 
school-age children, Mann-Whitney U = 920.50, Z = 3.59, p < .001, but not kindergartens, 
Mann-Whitney U = 1244.50, Z = 1.74, p = .082. Conversely, preschoolers were significantly less 
likely to reference controllable causes than kindergartens, Mann-Whitney U = 994.00, Z = 3.23, 
p = .001, and school-age children, Mann-Whitney U = 617.00, Z = 5.47, p < .001. 
Kindergarteners and school-age children did not differ significantly in their references to 
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This trend toward decreasing uncontrollable cause and increasing controllable cause 
references with increasing age was further confirmed by looking at correlations; exact age was 
negatively correlated with uncontrollable cause responses, ρ(160) = -0.27, p = .001, and 
positively correlated with controllable cause responses to counterfactual questions, ρ(160) = 
0.42, p < .001. 
Causal versus counterfactual responses 
Children were significantly more likely to reference an uncontrollable cause for causal 
questions than counterfactual questions, Z = 9.90, p < .001. This was also the case for each age 
group separately: preschoolers (Z = 5.12, p < .001), kindergarteners (Z = 6.01, p < .001), and 
school-age children (Z = 5.96, p < .001). Children were also more likely to reference both 
uncontrollable and controllable causes jointly in response to causal than counterfactual questions, 
Z = 5.40, p < .001. This trend held when looking separately at kindergarteners (Z = 3.84, p < 
.001), and school-age children (Z = 4.20, p < .001), but not preschoolers (Z = 0.54, p = .541). 
Children were significantly more likely to reference a controllable cause for 
counterfactual questions than causal questions, Z = 9.97, p < .001. This was also the case for 
each age group: preschoolers (Z = 4.68, p < .001), kindergarteners (Z = 6.11, p < .001), and 
school-age children (Z = 6.31, p < .001). 
We also examined intra-individual patterns of responses by looking at instances of when 
children responded in an “adult-like” way, by responding with an uncontrollable cause for causal 
questions and a controllable cause for counterfactual questions. With age, children showed an 
increasing tendency to respond in this way, ρ(160) = 0.30, p < .001.  
 
Discussion 
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Adults show predictable biases in counterfactual thinking (Byrne, 2005). In the current 
study, we asked whether and when children’s counterfactual thoughts show evidence for one 
such bias – a tendency to focus on controllable enabling conditions. Across all ages, and in line 
with previous research with adults (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; McCloy & Byrne, 2002), children 
most often referenced an uncontrollable strong cause (i.e., a force of nature) in response to causal 
questions and a controllable enabling condition (i.e., a character’s action) in response to 
counterfactual ones.  
The current results indicate that the majority of preschoolers are already channeling 
events differently when asked causal vs. counterfactual questions. Even before they provide a 
logically-correct answer to certain types of counterfactual questions (e.g., McCormack et al., 
2018) and long before they reason with counterfactual emotions (O’Connor, McCormack, & 
Feeney, 2012), children are already attuned to which events are counterfactually relevant – at 
least when it comes to controllable vs. uncontrollable causes. We also found earlier evidence for 
this counterfactual bias than previous studies measuring children’s use of the temporal order 
(Meehan & Bryne, 2005) and action biases (Payir & Guttentag, 2019). 
Comparing across ages, we found developmental differences in children’s counterfactual 
attributions. Preschoolers were significantly more likely to mention an uncontrollable natural 
cause in their counterfactuals (e.g., “The wind shouldn’t have blown”) than older children. 
Conversely, they were significantly less likely than older children to reference a controllable 
cause (e.g., “He should have brought the paper inside”). Although controllable causes were the 
most common response type among all age groups, we found that around 30% of preschoolers 
invoked an uncontrollable natural cause in their counterfactuals. What drives this developmental 
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difference? The current findings connect to a wider body of research suggesting that 
counterfactuals may play a changing role in judgment and reasoning with age.  
In adulthood, counterfactuals have been found to play a role in decision-making and self-
regulation. One prominent account, the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, argues that 
individuals think about how they could have acted differently in the past to secure a better 
outcome and plan to adapt their behavior in the future – a process that is often mediated by 
feelings of regret or relief (Epstude & Roese, 1997).  
This contribution of counterfactuals to decision-making and self-regulation may be one 
that emerges in middle childhood, as children’s counterfactual thoughts become more focused on 
human action. Children do not appear to understand counterfactual emotions such as relief and 
regret before the age of 6 (O’Connor, McCormack, & Feeney, 2012; Rafetseder & Perner, 2012), 
after they are able to reason about counterfactuals in other contexts (Beck & Riggs, 2014; 
Nyhout & Ganea, 2019a). Counterfactual considerations do not appear to enter into children’s 
judgments of regret and blame until late childhood (Payir & Guttentag, 2019), and 
counterfactuals may not factor into decision-making until between the ages of 6 and 9 
(McCormack & Feeney, 2015).  
The developmental shift toward controllable human causes that we observed in children’s 
counterfactual responses, and the increasing role of counterfactuals in emotion and decision-
making may have a similar underpinning – both involve an increasing focus on human action in 
counterfactuals. The impetus for this hypothesized change, however, is unknown. With age and 
experience, children may learn that human actions and decisions are changeable, whereas forces 
of nature are not. Through conversations with parents, children may also learn which types of 
events other individuals focus on in their counterfactuals.  
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Another explanation for the developmental differences we observed is a change in 
children’s conceptions of natural causes. Younger children are more likely to view forces of 
nature as animate beings (Carey, 1985; Piaget, 1929), which may result in an increased tendency 
to mutate these causes in their counterfactuals. “The sun shouldn’t have come out” is a less 
unusual response when one considers that young children are often presented with depictions of 
the Sun with agency, “hiding” behind the clouds and going away at night.   
Despite the observed developmental differences, kindergarteners and school-age 
children’s causal and counterfactual attributions looked very much like those of adults. This 
finding contributes to a growing body of work suggesting that, rather than being a late 
developing ability, counterfactual reasoning is available to children from relatively early in 
development (McCormack et al., 2018; Nyhout & Ganea, 2019a; 2019b). These findings also 
raise several questions, including in which other ways children’s counterfactuals may be similar 
to adults’, how other developmental, social, and cultural factors may contribute to which events 
children see as counterfactually-relevant, and why some children tend towards invoking natural 
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Story 1: Andy 
Andy is doing some 
drawing on the porch. 
He leaves his papers on 
the porch and goes 
inside to get some juice. 
The wind comes along 
and blows his papers 
away.  
Andy’s drawings are 
gone now. 
Why are Andy’s 
drawings gone? 
 
What did Andy 
go inside to get? 
What should have happened 
so Andy’s drawings would 
not be gone? 
Story 2: Claudia 
Claudia is playing with 
her dolls by the window. 
She leaves her dolls by 
the open window while 
she goes to watch TV. 
It starts to rain and the 
rain gets inside.  







her room to do? 
What should have happened 
so Claudia’s dolls would not 
be wet 
Story 3: Harry 
Harry is playing in the 
sand at the beach. 
He builds a sandcastle 
right beside the water 
and goes to get his 
bucket. 
A big wave comes along 
and knocks over the 
sandcastle.  
Harry’s sandcastle is 
ruined now. 
Why is Harry’s 
sandcastle 
ruined? 
What did Harry 
go to get? 
What should have happened 
so Harry’s sandcastle would 
not be ruined? 
Story 4: Katie 
Katie is hanging out at 
the park.  
Why does Katie 
not have ice 
cream? 
What did Katie 
go to do in the 
park? 
What should have happened 
so Katie’s ice cream would 
not be gone? 
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She puts her ice cream 
down on her blanket and 
goes off to fly her kite. 
The Sun comes out and 
melts her ice cream.  
Katie doesn’t have any 
ice cream now. 
 
 
 
 
 
